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1. Introduction 
In the literature, lack of access to external finance is generally seen as one of the main 
reasons why many people in developing economies remain poor. Usually, the poor 
have no access to loans from the formal banking system, because they cannot put up 
acceptable collateral and because the costs for banks of screening and monitoring the 
activities of the poor, and of enforcing their contracts, are too high to make lending to 
this  group  profitable.  Recently,  however,  the  poor  in  developing  economies  have 
increasingly  gained  access to small  loans  with  the  help  of so-called microfinance 
programs. During the past ten years, these programs have been introduced in many 
developing economies. According to one recent survey of a sample of such programs, 
16 per cent of them made use of so-called group lending to provide credit to the poor; 
they served more than two thirds of all borrowers from the microfinance programs 
included in the survey (Lapenu and Zeller, 2001). 
Group lending programs provide a loan to an individual borrower, who is a 
member of a borrowing group. The group of borrowers is made responsible for the 
repayment of the loan of the individual group member: all group members are jointly 
liable. Non-repayment by the group means that all borrowers in the group will be 
denied future access to loans from the program. In this way, group lending creates 
incentives for individual group members to screen and monitor the other members of 
the group and to enforce repayment, because each individual wants to reduce the risk 
of having to contribute to the repayment of loans of other members and since he/she 
wants  to ensure  access  to future  loans. Since the group lending  structure of joint 
liability  stimulates  screening,  monitoring  and  enforcement  of  contracts  among 
borrowers,  the  lender  no  longer  has  to  invest  in  screening,  monitoring  and 
enforcement  activities.  The  group  lending  structure  is  also  expected  to  be  more 
effective in providing such activities than the lender, because group members usually 
live close to each other and/or have social ties; they are therefore better informed 
about  each  other’s  activities.  In  the  literature  this  is  usually  referred  to  as  social 
collateral.  One  of  the  expected  advantages  of  group  lending  programs  and  joint 
liability  is  that  since  this  mechanism  stimulates  screening,  monitoring  and 
enforcement  within  the  group,  and  since  it  improves  the  effectiveness  of  these   3 
activities due to the fact that members live in the same area and/or are socially tied, 
repayment of group loans will be higher. 
  Theoretical  models  generally  confirm  that  joint  liability  leads  to  higher 
repayment performance due to more and more effective screening, monitoring and 
enforcement among group members. Most empirical studies on this issue support this 
view. Yet, most studies look at screening, monitoring and enforcement activities at 
the group level. In this paper, we analyze the possibility that the intensity and/or 
effectiveness of such activities differ among different types of group members and 
that  this  influences  the  repayment  performance  of  groups.  More  specifically,  we 
investigate  whether  there  is  a  difference  between  group  leaders  and  other  group 
members in providing these activities and whether this leads to different outcomes in 
terms of repayment performance. 
This analysis has been inspired by our observation that in many group-based 
lending programs groups have to elect a group leader after a group is formed and that 
the group leader plays an important role as an intermediary between the group and the 
program. The special intermediary role of the group leader may provide additional 
incentives to screen and monitor borrowers and enforce contracts within the group. 
As  far  as  we  know,  our  research  is  the  first  attempt  to  empirically  investigate 
differences  in  behavior  of  different  group  members  and  their  effect  on  group 
performance. 
  The empirical analysis in this paper uses data from an extensive questionnaire 
for two Eritrean group-based  lending  programs.  One distinguishing  feature  of  the 
Eritrean programs is that the group leader plays a prominent role in the functioning of 
the  group.  In  the  empirical  analysis  we  specifically  investigate  whether  this  has 
consequences  for  the  impact  monitoring  and  social  ties  have  on  repayment 
performance  of  the  group.  In  particular,  we  separately  analyze  the  impact  of 
monitoring and social ties of group leaders and other group members on repayment 
performance of groups. The questionnaire we have allows us to distinguish between 
monitoring activities and social ties of group leaders versus other group members. 
The focus on these two issues (leaving out screening and enforcement activities) is 
determined by data availability: the data we have do not allow us to also look at   4 
differences in screening and enforcement behavior of group versus non-group leaders 
and their impact on repayment performance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides  a 
review of the empirical literature on the relationship between group-based lending 
and repayment performance. Section 3 describes the main characteristics of the two 
group-based lending programs in Eritrea. In section 4 we describe the questionnaire 
we have conducted and the resulting data set we have used in the empirical part of 
this paper. In section 5 we present the empirical model we use in this paper, whereas 
in section 6 we provide descriptive statistics of the sample and discuss the outcomes 
of the empirical analysis. Finally, in section 8 we summarize the findings and provide 
some conclusions. 
 
2. Group-based lending and repayment performance: A brief review of the 
empirical literature 
One  of  the  issues  that  have  been  discussed  extensively  in  the  literature  on 
microfinance in general, and on group-based lending programs in particular, is the 
repayment performance of groups. Repayment of loans is an important measure for 
the success of these programs. In the long run, programs may only survive if groups 
repay the loans they receive. Otherwise, the programs will need continuous external 
financial support, which may not always be available. Moreover, low repayment rates 
provide adverse incentives to groups to also not repay their loans (Paxton, Graham 
and  Thraen,  2000).  Successful  programs  like  Grameen  Bank  and  Bancosol  have 
shown high repayment rates, as high as 90 to 95 per cent of all loans made to groups. 
At the same time, these programs are able to reach millions of poor borrowers. 
The  high  repayment  performance  of  these  programs  is  attributed  to  their 
ability  to  curb  problems  arising  from  asymmetry  of  information  related  to  loan 
contracts. Theoretical models show that group members in joint-liability group-based 
lending programs screen, monitor, and pressure each other in order not to end up 
paying for their defaulting members and to ensure access to loans in the future. Most 
of  these  models  do  not  deal  directly  with  repayment  performance  of  programs, 
however.  Rather,  it  is  implicitly  assumed  that  the  role  group  members  play  in   5 
screening, monitoring and enforcement reduces problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard, thereby improving repayment performance of groups.
1 Several authors 
have  empirically  investigated  the  predictions  of  these  models.  They  focus  on 
analyzing  the  determinants  of  repayment  performance  of  groups.  Below,  we  will 
shortly discuss these empirical studies and focus on describing their findings with 
respect  to  the  relationship  between  repayment  and  screening,  monitoring  and 
enforcement  activities  within  groups.  All  studies  implicitly  assume  that  if  such 
activities  are  available  to  members,  or  are  explicitly  carried  out  by  them,  this 
increases repayment performance of their group. 
Wenner (1995) provides one of the first empirical studies on the determinants 
of  repayment  of  groups.  He  uses  data  of  25  groups  from  FINCA,  a  group-based 
program in Costa Rica. His analysis indicates that repayment performance of groups 
improves  when  groups  have  written  (formal)  rules  stating  how  members  should 
behave.  This  variable  implicitly  measures  screening,  monitoring  and  enforcement 
activities  that  take  place  within  the  groups.  Another  variable  that  is  found  to 
determine repayment is the location of groups: if groups are located in remote areas 
this reduces their possibilities to have access to alternative sources of credit, which 
stimulates them to ensure group repayment as much as possible in order have future 
access  to  loans.  Wenner,  therefore,  seems  to  find  support  for  the  fact  that  these 
activities  take  place  within  groups  and  that  they  increase  their  repayment 
performance. 
Sharma  and  Zeller  (1997)  use  data  of  128  groups  from  four  group-based 
lending programs in Bangladesh to study the determinants of repayment. Sharma and 
Zeller  use  a  number  of  variables  that  may  measure  screening,  monitoring  and 
enforcement activities within groups. Their results show the following. First, they 
show that repayment problems increase when there are more relatives in the same 
group.  This  supports  the  hypothesis  that  screening,  monitoring  and  enforcement 
among relatives does not take place or at least is less effective, since relatives may 
more easily collude against the program and delay repayment.   Second, the results 
                                                            
1 These models have been reviewed extensively elsewhere (see, e.g., Ghatak and Guinnane, 
1999; Morduch, 1999)   6 
indicate  that  if  borrowers  are  more  credit  rationed  this  increases  repayment 
performance. This result can be taken as evidence for the fact that group members 
have more incentives to screen, monitor and enforce if they have no alternative credit 
sources. Third, they find that groups that were formed using a self-selection process 
show a better repayment performance. 
Matin  (1998)  uses  data  of  246  borrowers  from  the  Grameen  bank, 
Bangladesh. In his study he finds that members who have other credit sources and 
who have land use above some threshold level have a higher probability of showing 
repayment problems. These outcomes may indicate that since these borrowers have 
other credit opportunities or that they have accumulated substantial assets, they have 
less interest having future access to loans from the program, which may reduce their 
screening, monitoring and enforcement activities. This result is similar to the results 
of Wenner (1995) and Sharma and Zeller (1997).   
   Zeller (1998) looks at the repayment performance of six group-based lending 
programs in Madagascar, based on detailed information from 146 groups. Zeller uses 
measures of social ties between group members and finds evidence that groups with 
stronger ties show higher repayment rates. This supports the assumption that group 
members with stronger ties have more information about each other and are therefore 
better  able  to  screen,  monitor  and  enforce.  Moreover,  he  finds  that  groups  with 
internal rules and regulations demonstrate better repayment rates, a result that was 
also reported in the study by Wenner. As explained, such rules and regulations are 
indirect measures of screening, monitoring and enforcement activities that take place 
within the groups. 
  An influential study is carried out by Wydick (1999), who uses data of 137 
groups  from  FUNDAP,  a  group-based  lending  program  in  Guatemala.  Of  all  the 
papers in this review, this paper uses one of the most extensive lists of variables 
measuring  screening,  monitoring  and  enforcement  within  groups.  Wydick  finds 
evidence for the fact that the average distance between group members negatively 
influences repayment performance, whereas the knowledge one member has of the 
weekly sales of other members is positively related to repayment performance. Both 
variables  are  assumed  to measure  monitoring  activities  within  groups:  monitoring   7 
becomes more difficult if the distance between members increases, whereas having 
knowledge about the sales of other members can be taken as evidence for the fact that 
members monitor each other. 
  Another frequently cited study is from Paxton, Graham and Thraen (2000). 
They  have  data  of  140  groups  from  PPPCR,  a  group-based  lending  program  in 
Burkina Faso. They have a number of variables measuring screening, monitoring and 
enforcement  activities  and  find  significant  relations  between  these  variables  and 
repayment performance. First, their results show that the homogeneity of the group in 
terms of their ethnicity, occupation, income, etc., reduces its repayment performance. 
This may indicate that if members are more homogeneous they have lower incentives 
to screen, monitor and enforce each other and/or may start to collude against the 
program, a result that was reported by Sharma and Zeller (1997). Second, Paxton, 
Graham and Thraen show that groups that have received better training before they 
started  the  program  have  a  better  repayment  performance.  During  these  training 
programs members learn, among other things, how to behave and the results of this 
study indicates that these trainings increase screening, monitoring and enforcement 
activities. Third, Paxton et al. use a measure of group pressure, which is a proxy for 
enforcement within groups and find this measure to be positively related to repayment 
performance. Finally, and especially interesting for our own study, Paxton et al. also 
include  a  measure  of  the  quality  of  the  group  leader  in  running  the  group.  This 
measure also is positively related to repayment performance, which may be seen as 
evidence  for  the  fact  that  the  group  leader  plays  a  prominent  role  in  screening, 
monitoring  and  enforcement  within the  group.  This  is  related  to  our  research  we 
report on in this paper. 
  Finally,  Karlan  (2004)  uses  data  of  over  1,700  individual  members  of 
GINCA, a group-based lending program in Peru and finds the following results. First, 
he shows that the distance between  group members has a negative impact on the 
repayment  performance  of  a  group,  a  result  that  result  that  was  reported  also  by 
Wydick (1999). Second, Karlan shows that if group members are culturally similar 
this helps to improve repayment performance, based on the assumption that cultural 
similarity increases the probability that members know each other and therefore will   8 
be better able to screen, monitor and enforce each other. This result seem to contrast 
with  that  of  Paxton  et  al.  (2000),  who  found  a  negative  relationship  between  a 
measure of cultural similarity and repayment and explained this result in terms of 
possible collusion against the program. 
  Based on the above review, we conclude that empirical studies have provided 
evidence  that  screening,  monitoring  and  enforcement  activities  among  group 
members  generally  improves  the  repayment  performance  of  groups.  We  also 
conclude, however, that most of these studies look at these activities taking place at 
the group level. They do not look at differences in the intensity and/or effectiveness 
of these activities of different types of group members. This is what we will do in the 
remainder of the paper. 
 
3. Group-based lending in Eritrea and the role of the group leader 
Currently,  two  group-lending  programs  are  operating  in  Eritrea.  The  Saving  and 
Micro  Credit  program  (SMCP)  is  active  since  1996  and  is  part  of  the  Eritrean 
Community Development Fund (ECDF), a government related fund. The funding for 
this program comes from the Eritrean government, the World Bank and from grants 
from a number of individual donor countries. The Southern Zone Saving and Credit 
Scheme (SZSCS) started in 1994 and was launched by the Agency for Co-operation 
and Research in Development (ACORD), a British NGO. SMCP has its activities all 
over  the  country,  whereas  SZSCS  concentrates  its  efforts  in  the  southern  part  of 
Eritrea.  
SMCP works through village banks that administer the provision of loans to 
solidarity groups at the village level. These village banks are established as follows. 
First,  SMCP  officials  identify  rural  areas  in  which  village  banks  should  be 
established. Next, they organize a meeting with a village community and explain how 
the  program  works.  The  moment  the  village  community  agrees  to  the  terms  and 
conditions  to  be  followed  a  village  credit  committee  is  elected.  The  committee 
consists of an area administrator who acts as a chairperson and two other members 
who  are  responsible  for  accounts  and  record  keeping.  Once  the  committee  is 
established  the  village  bank  may  start  providing  credit.  The  bank  elects  its  own   9 
officers, creates its own by-laws, manages its loan funds, and reviews and approves 
loan requests. 
By the end of 2002 the program had established 162 village banks and had 
almost  14,000  members.  This  amount  increased  quite  substantially  since  the  late 
1990s: in 1998 the program had only 6,000 members. Groups in SMCP consist of 3-7 
members. Group members are not allowed to have family ties. Individuals are only 
allowed to borrow after they have accumulated mandatory savings equal to 10 per 
cent of the sum they want to borrow in the previous three months. The village banks 
typically provide loans to between 35-105 individuals. The size of the loans ranges 
between USD70 – USD710.
2 Loans are extended for a large range of activities, such 
as small-scale trading, dairy production, purchase of oxen, irrigated horticulture and 
other  agricultural  activities.  All  members  of  a  group  are  individually  liable  for 
repayment of the loan made to the group. The main aim of the use of group lending is 
that  due  to  the  joint  liability  element,  group  members  may  have  an  incentive  to 
monitor each other and, if necessary, may use pressure to force those members who 
fail or are unwilling to make repayments on time. In case an individual cannot repay, 
the other group members including the group leader will have to cover the repayment 
of the loan. Repayments are made on a monthly basis. In October 1999 the program 
had 6,223 beneficiaries with USD1.4 million of outstanding loans. Until September 
1999 the average reported repayment rate was 98 per cent (Seltene, 1999). 
  The organizational structure of SZSCS is only slightly different from that of 
SMCP. SZSCS works through credit and savings committees (CSCs) consisting of 
representatives  of  solidarity  groups  based  within  the  villages.  These  committees 
evaluate loan requests from groups they receive from the group leaders and forward 
them to the program management. Based on the information obtained from the CSCs 
the program management decides whether or not to give a loan to a group. By 1999 
the program had reached 192 villages. Groups in SZSCS consist of 3-7 members. The 
size of the loans ranges between USD70 – USD570. Initial loans to an individual may 
                                                            
2 We converted all data on income, loan size, etc, which in the original data set are given in 
Nakfa, the official currency of Eritrea, into US dollars (USD) using an exchange rate of USD1 
= 14 Nakfas. This was the official exchange rate at the time the data for this research were 
gathered.   10 
be no higher than USD150. Individuals are only allowed to borrow after they have 
accumulated  mandatory  savings  equal  to  five  per  cent  of  the  sum  they  want  to 
borrow. The amount of loans they are allowed to borrow increases after they have 
repaid previous loans, i.e. the program makes use of dynamic incentives. For repeat 
loans  the  savings  requirement  may  go  up  to  a  maximum  of  15  per  cent  of  the 
borrowed sum. Again, loans are provided for activities such as small-scale trading, 
dairy  production,  purchase  of  oxen,  irrigated  horticulture  and  other  agricultural 
activities. Some 80 per cent of the borrowers live in rural areas. As in SMCP, in 
SZSCS all members of a group are individually liable for repayment of the loan made 
to  the  group  and  repayments  have  to  be  made  on  a  monthly  basis.  In  2001  the 
program had a portfolio of 6,250 loans. The reported repayment rate was 98 per cent.
3 
The above descriptions of SMCP and SZSCS make clear that the activities 
and organization of both programs are very similar. Table 1 provides an overview of 
the main characteristics of both programs, showing that they are indeed similar in 
most respects. They both are active in rural as well as in urban areas. The borrowers 
in  both  programs  are  active  as  retailers,  farmers,  or  small-scale  producers.  Both 
programs are set up along the lines of the Grameen Bank model. Groups are formed 
through  self-selection.  After  a  group  is  accepted  by  one  of  the  two  programs, 
members  are  required  to  go  through  a  short  training  program.  Group  members 
regularly meet to discuss issues like the performance of their economic activities and 
repayment performance of individuals. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
Groups in both programs have to select a group leader. The group can select 
anyone  of  its  members  to  become  the  group  leader.  The  group  leader  is  the 
intermediary  between  the  group  and  the  program  staff  (i.e.  the  program’s  credit 
officer and/or the village credit committee or bank). He/she has to regularly report to 
the program’s staff on the performance and sustainability of the group. Moreover, 
                                                            
3 All data on SZSCS are obtained from the ACORD website, and in particular from the page 
providing  information  on  SZSCS:  www.acord.org.uk/h-ert4.htm  (consulted  on  6  February   11 
he/she has to chair group meetings, collect the install payments from group members 
and transfer them to the credit officer, visit group members regularly and discusses 
business  and/or  group  related  problems,  and  call  for  extra  group  meetings  if 
repayment problems occur. Being a group leader is a voluntary activity; it does not 
generate any (financial) remuneration.  
Based on this description of tasks, we conclude that the group leader plays a 
prominent  role  in  the  functioning  of  the  group.  In  particular,  several  of  his/her 
activities described above seem to be related to monitoring and enforcement of other 
members. For example, the decision to call for extra group meetings can be seen as an 
effort to  increase monitoring,  and  perhaps  even  enforcement efforts by the  group 
leader. Moreover, his/her role of collecting install payments from group members and 
reporting to the program on the performance of the group provides the group leader 
additional  channels  through  which  information  is  collected  and  monitoring  and 
enforcement may take place. This also holds for his/her explicit task, demanded by 
the  program,  to  regularly  visit  other  members  and  discuss  their  problems.  These 
channels are less explicitly available to the other group members. 
This leads to us to hypothesize that especially monitoring and enforcement 
activities within a group may differ between the group leader and the other group 
members. More precisely, we expect these activities to be more strongly related to 
repayment performance when performed by the group leader than by the other group 
members, either because group leaders show a higher intensity of monitoring and 
enforcement, or because their activities are more effective in promoting repayment of 
group loans. This hypothesis will be tested in the next sections. 
 
4. The sample 
In the year 2000 we conducted a survey among 102 groups, of which 56 were in 
SMCP and 46 were in SZSCS.
 4 Most of these groups were based in small villages 
and secondary towns of Eritrea. In the survey we asked questions about the socio-
economic  characteristics  of  the  group  members,  as  well  as  about  the  saving  and 
                                                                                                                                                        
2003).    
4 The complete questionnaire is available upon request from the authors.   12 
repayment  performance  of  individual  group  members.  In  addition,  we  included 
questions  on  the  group  formation  process,  the  existence  of  social  ties,  and  on 
processes of screening, monitoring and enforcement within groups. From each group 
we selected the group leader and one or more other members to answer the questions. 
Part of the questions was submitted to both the group leader and the other member(s) 
of  each  group;  another  part  of  the  questions  was  specifically  asked  to  the  group 
leader. We included separate questions for the group leader, since, as was described 
earlier, we observed that the group leader has a quite important role to play as a 
representative  of  the  group  to  the  program  organization.  This  set-up  of  the 
questionnaire provides us with a unique data set, in which we have information on 
characteristics and group behavior related to screening, monitoring and enforcement 
at the individual level. In particular, it allows us to investigate behavior of the group 
leaders versus that of the other group members, and the impact of this behavior on 
repayment performance of the groups. 
Through  the  questionnaire  we  obtained  information  from  351  group 
members, of which 102 were group leaders. Of the total sample of group members, 
167 were participating in the SZSCS program and 184 in the SMCP program. Within 
the  sample,  196  borrowers  were  females  (56  per  cent)  and  155  were  males.  The 
majority  (68 per  cent) of the respondents  had no or only  primary  education.  The 
average monthly income of group members was approximately USD75. Trade (63 per 
cent) and farming (17 per cent) were the main occupations of group members; many 
of them usually had two (or more) occupations at the same time.  
On  average  groups  were  composed  of  4.5  members,  with  a  median  of  4, 
ranging from a minimum of three to a maximum of seven members. The amount of 
loan cycles (or loan rounds) groups had completed up to the interview ranged from a 
minimum  of  two  to  a  maximum  of  seven  with  an  average  of  3.6  cycles.  Group 
savings were approximately USD155, ranging from just USD20 to USD500. Group 
loans ranged from USD54 to USD607 with mean and median loan size of USD282 
and  USD250,  respectively.  Loan  terms  varied  from  three  to  24  months.  Group 
members  mainly  used the  loans  for  working capital  purposes.  In  some  cases,  the 
money was used to buy livestock and raw materials. Only 18 respondents reported   13 
they had other sources of credit, such as banks (5), money lenders (2) and relatives 
(6), next to the loan from the group lending program. Most respondents (337) had 
never even applied for a bank loan. This seems to indicate that the group members 
were dependent on the group loans for external funds. Of the total sample, 17 per cent 
of the group members responded they have had repayment problems in the past. 
  Of the 102 group leaders, 46 were in a group in the SZSCS program and 56 in a 
group  of  the  SMCP  program;  54  of  them were males (53 per  cent) and  48  were 
females. Group leaders income was similar (USD72) to the average income level of 
all group members in the sample. They were also very similar to the average group 
member in terms of occupation: 61 per cent of them were active in trade, whereas 15 
per cent were active in farming. 
 
5. The empirical model 
As was already mentioned above, the empirical literature described in section 2 is 
different  from  this  paper’s  work.  Whereas  most  other  empirical  papers  use  data 
acquired only from one group member as a representative of his group, in this paper, 
we have data from at least two members of each group. One of these members is the 
group leader and the other (s) is (are) member(s) other than the group leader. This 
allows us to split the information for the independent variables, such as individual 
characteristics  and  group  behavior  into  two  separate  variables,  one  related  to  the 
group leader and one related to the other group members excluding the group leader. 
The  specification  of  the  empirical  model  we  use  can  be  summarized  as 
follows: 
 
ARREAR = α + β GL + γ NGL + δ GROUP + µ       (1) 
 
ARREAR is a vector of dependent variables; GL is a vector of variables reflecting 
screening,  monitoring  and  enforcement  efforts,  social  ties  and  individual 
characteristics of group leaders; NGL is a vector of variables reflecting screening, 
monitoring and enforcement efforts, social ties and individual characteristics of the   14 
other  group  members;  and  GROUP  is  a  vector  of  variables  reflecting  screening, 
monitoring and enforcement efforts, and characteristics at the group level. 
We  use  three  different  dependent  variables:  ARREAR  1,  ARREAR  2  and 
ARREAR 3. All three variables are dummy variables that have a value of 0 or 1. 
ARREAR 1 has a value of 1 if at least one member of a group indicated that he has 
had repayment problems in the current loan cycle.  ARREAR 2 has a value of 1 if at 
least one member of a group other than the group leader indicated that he has had 
repayment problems in the current loan cycle. ARREAR 3 has a value of 1 if the group 
leader indicated that he has had repayment problems in the current loan cycle. 
We use  a logit  model  to  estimate  the  effects  of independent variables  on 
reducing  the  incidence  of  repayment  problems.  These  independent  variables  are 
measures  of  screening  and  monitoring  and  enforcement  activities,  social  ties,  and 
other control variables. For each variable we use two different versions, those related 
to the group members, excluding the group leader, and those related to the group 
leader.  As  indicated,  the  reason  why  we  use  these  two  different  versions  of  the 
independent variables is that group leaders in the two Eritrean programs appear to 
play an important role in coordinating the activities of the group members and are 
representatives of the group to the programs. The set-up of our empirical analysis 
allows us to investigate whether screening, monitoring and enforcement activities of 
group leaders have an impact on the repayment performance that is different from the 
impact of these activities of the other group members. Also, we are able to investigate 
whether social ties of group leaders have a different impact on repayment than those 
of  the  other  group  members.  As  explained  before,  the  existence  of  these  ties  is 
expected  to  raise  the  effectiveness  of  screening,  monitoring  and  enforcement 
activities, and this way they are expected to improve repayment performance. The 
variables  related  to  group  members  other  than  the  group  leader  are  presented  in 
averages; this is not the case for variables related group leaders.  
Initially, we aimed at using all variables for which we had information in our 
empirical investigation. Yet, after carefully analyzing the data we were forced to drop 
several variables because of high correlation between some of them. Moreover, some 
variables showed very low variability, which made it not useful to include them in the   15 
analysis. Therefore, in the analysis on which we report in this paper we only use a 
subset  of  the  variables  we  had  information  on.
5  In  particular,  due  to  the  data 
problems, variables measuring screening and enforcement activities had to be deleted 
from the complete list of variables.  This is why the paper only focuses on differences 
in monitoring activities and social ties of group leaders and other group members and 
their impact on repayment performance. 
The list of variables used in the analysis is given below. First, we discuss 
eight group leader-specific variables (the vector GL in equation (1)). These variables 
can be divided into three sub-sets: 
-  Variables measuring monitoring at the individual level: 
•  DIST  =  the  average  distance  (in  meters)  of  homestead  or  business 
location of the group leader from the other members of the group; 
•  VISTDUM = 1 if the group leader regularly visits the other members of 
his group. 
-  Variables measuring social ties: 
•  KNMEMDUM = 1 if the group leader knew the other group members 
before the formation of the group; 
•  LIVE = the length of time (in years) the group leader has lived in the 
interview area. 
-  Control variables measuring personal characteristics of group members: 
•  AGE = the age of the group leader; 
•  AINSTAPA  =  the  monthly  install  payment  of  the  group  leader  as  a 
percentage of his income; 
•  VFACCESS = the value group leader attaches to having access to loans 
from the lending program in the future, ranging from 1 (=very highly 
value) to 4 (=very low value); 
•  EDUCATION = the educational background of the group leader, ranging 
from 1 (= illiterate) to 4 (= secondary). 
                                                            
5 The full list of variables for which we have information through the questionnaire, as well as 
the correlation analysis we performed to obtain the subset of variables we have used in the 
analysis in this paper, can be obtained from the authors.   16 
 
Next to the group leader-specific variables, we have the same eight variables 
for the other group members (the vector NGL in equation (1)). The variable names of 
these variables are similar, yet in some cases shorter. Also, the prefix AV is added to 
the above mentioned variable names, indicating that they refer to averages of other 
group  members.  Moreover, NGL is added  to  the  name to indicate  that  a  variable 
relates to the other group members. Thus, for example the variable KNMEMDUM for 
the  group  leader  is  transformed  into  AVKNMNGL  for  the  other  group  members. 
Finally, we have two group-level variables (the vector GROUP in equation (1)): 
•  GRAGRDUM = 1 if the group has rules and regulation on how to run the 
group; 
•  NOMEM = the amount of members in a group. 
Table 2 summarizes the list of variables used in our empirical analysis. Table A2 in 
the appendix of the paper provides the descriptive statistics of these variables. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> 
 
The  variables  DIST  and  VISTDUM  indicate  the  extent  to  which  group 
members have information about each other, which may assist them to monitor each 
other. For DIST we expect a positive sign of the coefficient: the longer the distance 
between a member and other group members the more difficult it is to monitor his 
peers and the higher the repayment problems. For VISTDUM we expect a negative 
sign  of  the  coefficient:  if  the  dummy  is  equal  to  1,  the  probability  of repayment 
problems falls, since the more a group member visits other group members the higher 
is the opportunity to monitor their behavior. The variable GRAGRDUM is also related 
to monitoring but refers to the group as a whole. For GRAGRDUM we expect to find 
a negative sign: if the dummy is equal to 1 it indicates that the group uses rules and 
regulations, which may enhance monitoring activities, and this helps to reduce the 
probability of repayment problems. 
The  variables  KNMEMDUM  and  LIVE  measure  the  degree  to  which 
individuals within a group are expected to have social ties. LIVE indicates to what   17 
extent group members live in the same vicinity; KNMEMDUM measures whether 
they know each other before the formation of the group. Living close to each other 
and  knowing  the  other  members  may  help  to  monitor  each  other’s  behavior  in 
advance  of  group  formation  and  use  social  sanctions  against  delaying  members, 
which help mitigate repayment problems.  
  For KNMEMDUM and LIVE we expect a negative sign of the coefficient: if 
the dummy for KNMEMDUM is equal to 1, it indicates that the interviewee knows the 
other  members,  which  increases  the  existence  of  social  ties  and  reduces  the 
probability of repayment problems from occurring. Similarly, for LIVE the longer a 
group member has lived in the locality the higher the extent of social ties and the 
lower the probability of repayment problems. 
Finally,  we  have  six  control  variables:  AGE,  EDUCATION,  NOMEM, 
AINSTAPA and VFACCESS. The variable NOMEM refers to the size of the group as a 
whole. For NOMEM we expect no explicit sign, it may have a positive or negative 
sign depending the theoretical model used/applied
6. For AINSTAPA we expect to find 
a positive sign: the higher the amount of a member’s install payment as a percentage 
of his income, the higher the probability this individual faces repayment problems. 
For VFACCESS we expect a negative sign. The higher the value members assign to 
future credit assess from the lending program the lower the incidence of repayment 
problems. For AGE and EDUCATION we have no clear expectations about the sign 
of the coefficient.  
 
6. Empirical results 
The empirical analysis is carried out as follows. We start by estimating the complete 
model, using logit analysis. The model includes 18 independent variables: eight for 
the vector GL, eight for the vector NGL and two for the vector GROUP. Next, we 
delete variables from the model for which we do not find significant coefficients, 
                                                            
6 Theories suggest that the larger the group size the higher the probability of members to show 
group solidarity, leading them to support a member in repayment problem (Devereux and 
Fishe, 1993). On the other hand, the larger the group size, the lower the degree of monitoring 
among group members, as the likelihood of free riding increases, leading  to an increased 
likelihood of repayment problems (Armendariz de Aghion, 1999).   18 
until  we  find  the  best  fitting  model,  that  is,  the  model  including  only  significant 
coefficients.
7 To achieve this, we delete those variables for which the Z-statistic of the 
coefficient is less than one. Tables 3, 4 and 5 provide the results of the empirical 
analysis. The Z-statistics are given in parentheses.  
Table 3 shows the results when using ARREAR 1 (repayment problems of all 
members of a group) as the dependent variable. Equations 3-1 to 3-3 indicate that 
some of the variables have statistically significant coefficients, even after excluding 
non-significant variables, indicating that these variables do play a role in mitigating 
repayment problems. From the variables related to the group leader KNMEMDUM is 
significant  with  the  expected  sign.  The  other  group  leader  variable  found  to  be 
statistically  significant  is  VFACCESS,  indicating  that  the  higher  the  value  group 
leaders give to future access to loans from the program, the higher the repayment 
performance of groups. From the variables related to group members other than the 
group leader most of them fail to be statistically significant. The only exception is 
AVINSTNGL, which persists to be statistically significant with the right sign in all 
equations shown in Table 3. This variable indicates that the higher the install payment 
burden of group members other than the group leader as a percentage to their income 
the higher the probability of repayment problems. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE> 
 
Table 4 shows the results when we use ARREAR 2 (repayment problems of 
group  members  other  than  group  leader)  as  our  dependent  variable.  From  the 
variables  related  to  the  group  leader  KNMEMDUM  and  LIVE  are  statistically 
significant. Yet, LIVE has the wrong sign and is therefore dropped from the model in 
                                                            
7  The  econometric  strategy  we  follow  here  is  the  so-called  general-to-specific  approach. 
Another way of approaching the econometric modeling is to take the specific-to-general (or 
bottom-up) approach, which starts from a small model, including only theoretically correct 
variables and then test various specifications of this smaller model. There is discussion about 
which of these two approaches is preferred (Brooks, 2002). One of the advantages of the 
approach  we  have  taken  is  that  “…the  statistical  consequences  from  excluding  relevant 
variables are usually considered more serious than those from including irrelevant variables.” 
(Brooks, 2002, pp.209-210).   19 
equation 4-2. The other group leader variable found to be statistically significant is 
VFACCESS with the right sign. From the variables related to group members other 
than  the  group  leader  most  of  them  fail  to  be  significant  with  the  exception  of 
AVINSTNGL and AVKNMNGL. Yet, AVKNMNGL has the wrong sign and is therefore 
dropped from the model in equation 4-2. AVINSTNGL appears with the expected sign 
indicating that the higher the install payment burden of group members other than the 
group leader as a percentage of their income, the higher the probability of repayment 
problems.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 4 HERE> 
 
Table 5 presents the outcomes when using ARREAR 3 (repayment problems 
of  group  leaders)  as  the  dependent  variable.  The  results  show  that  some  of  the 
variables have statistically significant coefficients, indicating that these variables do 
play  a  role  in  the  mitigation  of  repayment  problems.  Yet,  variables  measuring 
monitoring and social ties are not among them. From the variables related to group 
leader AGE is statistically significant indicating that the older the group leader, the 
higher the repayment problems he faces. The other group leader variables found to be 
statistically  significant  are  AINSTAPA  and  VFACCESS.  AINSTAPA  indicates  the 
monthly install payment of the group leader as a percentage of his income and this 
shows that the higher the monthly repayment burden of the group leader the higher is 
his repayment problems. VFACCESS indicates that the higher the value group leader 
gives  to  future  access  of  loans  from  the  program  the  lower  are  his  repayment 
problems.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 5 HERE> 
 
Below, we summarize the main results of the empirical analysis and discuss 
how these results may be interpretated. Table 6 provides an overview of the main 
results from Tables 3-5. 
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<INSERT TABLE 6> 
 
Most importantly, the empirical analysis provides statistical evidence for the 
hypothesis that social ties of the group leader are more strongly related to repayment 
performance than social ties of other group members. Group leaders in the Eritrean 
lending programs play a role in compelling members to repay through social ties 
(KNMEMDUM  is  statistically  significant),  which  leads  to  better  repayment 
performance. There is no evidence that social ties of the other group members have a 
similar  effect  (AVKNMNGL  is  never  statistically  significant).  These  results  are 
reported in Tables 3 and 4. 
In contrast, we are unable to find evidence for the hypothesis that monitoring 
of group leaders is more strongly related to repayment performance than monitoring 
of other group members. None of the monitoring variables (neither for the group 
leader, nor for the other group members) is found to be statistically significant. 
The fact that social ties of the group leader positively affect group repayment, 
whereas his/her monitoring activities do not, leads us to conclude that social ties of 
the leader are mainly used to pressure other group members to repay. 
How can we explain the results with respect to the different impact of social 
ties of the group leader versus the other group members on repayment performance? 
We propose two alternative interpretations.
8 First of all, this result may indicate that 
group leaders actively use social ties to compel other group members to make their 
repayments in due time, whereas the other group members do not. Apparently, the 
other group members stay aloof from using their social ties activities to pressure their 
fellow group mates and leave the group leaders to do the job for them. Put differently, 
in case of the group leaders the social ties variables really do measure social ties, 
whereas in case of the other group members they do not. This may be true if group 
members free ride on the efforts made by their group leader to reduce the occurrence 
of moral hazard. As was discussed in section 3, in the Eritrean programs a group 
leader has quite an important role to play as the representative of the group to the 
                                                            
8 Our analysis does not allow us to decide which of the two interpretations is most likely to 
hold in practice.   21 
program organization and he/she may generate all kinds of activities that may help 
improve repayment performance of the group he/she represents. This may leave little 
incentives for other group members to put much effort into using their social ties to 
pressure group members to repay, especially since these efforts may be costly and 
time consuming.  
Alternatively, the results may indicate that social ties of group leaders are 
efficient in reducing repayment problems, whereas social ties of other group members 
are not. Thus, if the group leader knows the other members he/she really uses this 
knowledge  to  put pressure  on  other  members to repay  their debts,  which  reduces 
incidences of repayment problems At the same time, if other group members know 
other  members  and  this  is  used  to  pressure  to  repay,  this  does  not  reduce  the 
probability of repayment problems. Apparently, group members only feel pressured 
to behave prudently when the group leader pressures them, perhaps because he/she 
may  have  more  means  to  sanction  repayment  problems  due  to  his  role  as  the 
representative of the group to the program organization. 
The final  question we  have  to  address  then  is  why  an individual may be 
interested in becoming a group leader? As was stated in section 3, being a group 
leader is a voluntary activity; it does not generate any (financial) remuneration. There 
are two possible answers to this question.
9 First, as the results in summary table 6 
clearly show, VFACCESS, a variable measuring how much value a member attaches 
to future access of loans from the program, is found to be significant for the group 
leader but not for the other group members. This result is found consistently in all 
three specifications of the model (Tables 3-5). The result may indicate that a group 
leader  attaches  a  higher  than  average  value  to  future  access  to  loans  from  the 
program. This encourages an individual to take up the position of the group leader, 
which allows him/her to put more pressure on repayment of group members due to 
the special tasks he/she has within the group, such as the regularly contact with the 
program’s staff on the performance and sustainability of the group, the chairing of 
group  meetings, collecting  the  install payments from group  members and transfer 
                                                            
9 Again, our analysis does not allow us to decide which of the two interpretations is most 
likely to hold in practice.   22 
them to the credit officer, regularly visiting group members, and calling for extra 
group meetings if repayment problems occur. 
A  second  answer  may  be  that  an  individual  may  attach  a  high  value  to 
becoming a group leader, even though this does not generate a direct formal reward. 
Being a group leader may generate a stock of (non-financial) obligations of the other 
group members to the group leader, which he/she may claim at a later date (Warning 
and Sadoulet, 1998). Thus, if an individual takes up the task of group leader, he/she 
may be compensated by future support from one or more other group members in 
constructing  his/her  house  or  in  harvesting  his/her  crops.  In  a  rural  society  with 
underdeveloped markets and institutions such non-financial obligations may play an 
important role in the survival strategy of individuals. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed whether monitoring and social ties mitigate the incidence of 
repayment problems among group members in two group-based lending programs 
operating in Eritrea. In particular, the empirical has focused on investigating whether 
the effects of monitoring and social ties of the group leader and other group members 
on  group  repayment  differ.  Based  on  the  description  of  the  characteristics  of  the 
programs in Eritrea and the definition of the role of the group leader in these program, 
we hypothesize that the montoring activities and social ties of the group leader have a 
stronger positive impact on the repayment performance of groups. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first empirical study looking at this issue. 
Our empirical  results show  that social ties  of  the  group leader  do  have  a 
positive effect on repayment performance of groups, whereas this is not true for social 
ties  of  other  group  members.  So,  with  respect  to  social  ties  our  hypothesis  is 
supported. We do not find evidence for the hypothesis that monitoring activities of 
the group leader have a stronger positive impact on group repayment performance. 
All variables measuring monitoring activities, either of the group leader or the other 
group members, are found to be statistically insignificant.  
The importance of our results, we believe, is twofold. First of all, they show 
that when studying repayment performance of group-based programs, it is important   23 
take into account differences in behavior of individual group members to explain why 
a group repays or not. We have shown that these differences exist between the group 
leader and the other group members. Secondly, the results of this study actually do 
seem  to  question  existing  theoretical  models  of  how  group-based  lending  works. 
Whereas  most  models  assume  that  all  group  members  perform  monitor  and 
enforcement  activities  and  that  it  effectively  leads  to  improving  repayment 
performance, this study suggests that this may not be true. Our results do seem to 
suggest that, at least in the Eritrean case, a model of delegated monitoring exists, 
where the group leader is the delegated monitor of the microfinance program. 
Further research on the issues addressed in this paper could go a number of 
ways.  We  suggest  two  here.  First,  the  methodology  proposed  in  our  study  to 
separately look at the group leader and the other group members when it comes to 
monitoring and enforcement activities, should also be applied for other programs in 
other countries to see whether the results from this study can be generalized. Second, 
theoretical as well as empirical studies could verify whether the delegated monitoring 
model, to which our results seem to be related most, is superior or not in terms of 
reducing repayment problems as compared to other group-based lending practices.    24 
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Table 1: Comparing the Characteristics of the Two Eritrean  
Group-lending Programs (as of 2002) 
  SMCP  SZSCS 
     
Membership  14,000  9,000 
Average loan balance (in Nafkas)  1,658  1,897 
Typical loan term  One year  One year 
Percent female members  45  51 
Mostly rural or urban?  Mostly rural  Mostly rural 
Group-lending contracts?  Yes  Yes 
Collateral required?  No  No 
Compulsory savings before loans are made?  Yes  Yes 
Voluntary savings emphasized?  No  No 
Progressive lending?  Yes  Yes 
Regular repayment schedules  Monthly  Monthly 
Target clients for lending  Poor  Poor 
Currently financially sustainable?  No  No 
Nominal interest on loans (annually)  16%  14% 
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Table 2: Description of the independent variables used in the analysis 
Variable name  Type  Explanation 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
   
ARREAR 1    1 if at least one member of a group indicated that he has had repayment 
problems in the current loan cycle   
ARREAR 2    1 if at least one member of a group other than the group leader indicated 
that he has had repayment problems in the current loan cycle 
ARREAR 3    1 if the group leader indicated that he has had repayment problems in the 
current loan cycle 
     
GROUP LEADER VARIABLES 
 (=  vector GL) 
 
   
KNMEMDUM  Social ties  1 if the group leader knows the other group members before forming the 
group 
LIVE  Social ties  Number of years the group leader has lived in the survey area 
DIST   Monitoring  Average  distance  (in  meters)  between  the  group  leader  and  other 
members of the group 
VISTDUM   Monitoring  1 if the group leader regularly visits other group members 
VFACCESS  Personal/ 
control 
The value the group leader attaches to having access to loans from the 
credit program in the future; ranges from 1 (= very high) to 4 (= very 
low) 
AINSTAPA  Personal/ 
control 
Monthly install payment of the group leader (% of income) 
AGE  Personal/ 
control 
Age of the group leader (in years) 
EDUCATION  Personal/ 
Control 
Educational background of the group leader; ranges from 1 (= illiterate) 
to 4 (= secondary school) 
     
OTHER GROUP MEMBERS 
(= vector NGL) 
 
   
AVKNMNGL   Social ties  1 if the group member knows the other group members before forming 
the group 
AVLIVNGL  Social ties  Number of years the group member has lived in the survey area 
AVDISTNGL  Monitoring  Average  distance  (in  meters)  between  a  group  member  and  other 
members of the group 
AVISTNGL  Monitoring  1 if the group member regularly visits other group members 
AVFACNGL  Personal/ 
control 
The value the group member attaches to having access to loans from the 
credit program in the future, ranging from 1 (= very high) to 4 (= very 
low) 
AVINSTNGL  Personal/ 
control 
Monthly install payment of the group member (% of income) 
AVAGENGL   Personal/ 
control 
Age of the group member (in years) 
AVEDUNGL  Personal/ 
Control 
Educational  background  of  the  group  member;  ranges  from  1  (= 
illiterate) to 4 (= secondary school) 
     
OTHER VARIABLES 
(= vector GROUP) 
 
   
GRAGRDUM  Group/ 
control 
1 if the group has rules and regulation on how to run the group 
 
NOMEM  Group/ 
control 
Number of members in a group   28 
Table 3: Logit estimation results using ARREAR 1 as the dependent variable 
  3-1  3-2  3-3 
GROUP LEADER VARIABLES 
 
     
KNMEMDUM  -1.946 
(-2.608)*** 
-1.292 
(-2.024)** 
-1.192 
(-1.948)* 
AGE  0.018 
(0.722) 
   
DIST   0.001 
(1.118) 
0.001 
(1.106) 
 
AINSTAPA  1.025 
(0.791) 
   
VFACCESS  0.953 
(2.014)** 
1.121 
(2.654)*** 
1.082 
(2.684)*** 
VISTDUM  -0.101 
(-0.189) 
   
LIVE  0.010 
(0.561) 
   
EDUCATION  -0.145 
(-0.412) 
   
OTHER GROUP MEMBERS 
 
     
AVKNMNGL   1.650 
(1.825) 
   
AVDISTNGL  -0.864 
(-0.171) 
   
AVAGENGL   -0.021 
(-0.642) 
   
AVLIVNGL  0.015 
(0.849) 
   
AVINSTNGL  2.122 
(1.575)* 
2.400 
(2.536)** 
2.376 
(2.485)** 
AVFACNGL  0.224 
(0.630) 
   
AVISTNGL  -0.748 
(-1.099) 
-0.443 
(-0.703) 
 
AVEDUNGL  0.177 
(0.455) 
   
OTHER VARIABLES 
 
     
GRAGRDUM  0.153 
(0.273) 
   
NOMEM  -0.139 
(-0.598) 
   
       
CONSTANT  -2.992 
(-1.031) 
-1.906 
(-2.009)** 
-2.129 
(-2.700)*** 
Number of obs.  102  102  102 
Obs. with dependent = 0  68  68  68 
% of correctly predicted   79  75  75 
 McFadden 
2 R   0.19  0.12  0.11 
Notes:  The Z-statistics are given in parentheses. Explanation of the variable names can be 
found in table 2. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level. 
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Table 4: Logit estimation results using ARREAR 2 as the dependent variable 
  4-1  4-2  4-3 
GROUP LEADER VARIABLES 
 
     
KNMEMDUM  -2.500 
(-2.817)*** 
-1.193 
(-1.916)* 
-1.117 
(-1.869)* 
AGE  -0.011 
(-0.404) 
   
DIST   0.001 
(0.844) 
   
AINSTAPA  1.096 
(0.857) 
   
VFACCESS  0.650 
(1.502)* 
0.735 
(1.948)* 
0.695 
(1.894)* 
VISTDUM  0.128 
(0.233) 
   
LIVE  0.050 
(2.161) 
   
EDUCATION  0.125 
(0.351) 
   
OTHER GROUP MEMBERS 
 
     
AVKNMNGL   1.523 
(1.579) 
   
AVDISTNGL  0.715 
(0.141) 
   
AVAGENGL   0.015 
(0.364) 
   
AVLIVNGL  0.003 
(0.167) 
   
AVINSTNGL  1.260 
(1.005) 
1.752 
(1.868)* 
1.663 
(1.876)* 
AVFACNGL  -0.243 
(-0.643) 
   
AVISTNGL  -0.801 
(-1.286) 
-0.738 
(-1.105) 
 
AVEDUNGL  0.382 
(1.017) 
0.420 
(1.109) 
 
OTHER VARIABLES 
 
     
GRAGRDUM  0.212 
(0.358) 
   
NOMEM  -0.302 
(-1.043) 
-0.076 
(-0.388) 
 
       
CONSTANT  -3.062 
(-1.041) 
-1.597 
(-0.953) 
-1.681 
(-2.184)*** 
       
Number of obs.  102  102  102 
Obs. with dependent = 0  74  74  74 
% of correctly predicted    84  86  75 
McFadden 
2 R   0.19  0.09  0.07 
Notes:  The Z-statistics are given in parentheses. Explanation of the variable names can be 
found in table 2. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level.   30 
 
Table 5: Logit estimation results using ARREAR 3 as the 
dependent variable 
  5-1  5-2  -3 
GROUP LEADER VARIABLES 
 
     
KNMEMDUM  1.394 
(1.051) 
   
AGE  0.085 
(2.796)*** 
0.066 
(2.691)*** 
0.049 
(2.635)*** 
DIST   0.001 
(0.859) 
   
AINSTAPA  2.237 
(1.479) 
2.732 
(2.277)** 
2.239 
(2.167)** 
VFACCESS  1.488 
(2.144)** 
1.371 
(2.066)** 
1.227 
(1.879)* 
VISTDUM  0.124 
(0.141) 
   
LIVE  -0.049 
(-1.912)* 
-0.024 
(-1.291) 
 
EDUCATION  -0.271 
(-0.517) 
   
OTHER GROUP MEMBERS 
 
     
AVKNMNGL   1.358 
(1.168) 
   
AVDISTNGL  -0.001 
(-0.412) 
   
AVLIVNGL  -0.010 
(-0.483) 
   
AVINSTNGL  1.620 
(0.928) 
   
AVFACNGL  0.624 
(1.153) 
0.368 
(0.981) 
 
AVISTNGL  -0.164 
(-0.147) 
   
AVEDUNGL  0.287 
(0.619) 
   
OTHER VARIABLES 
 
     
GRAGRDUM  -1.045 
(-1.060) 
-0.897 
(-0. 934) 
 
NOMEM  0.212 
(0.688) 
   
       
CONSTANT  -11.862 
(-2.596)*** 
-7.681 
(-4.566)*** 
-6.893 
(-4.121)*** 
       
Number of obs.  102  102  102 
Obs. with dependent = 0  89  89  89 
% of correctly predicted    97  96  91 
McFadden 
2 R   0.25  0.18  0.16 
Notes:  The Z-statistics are given in parentheses. Explanation of the variable names can be 
found in table 2. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level. 
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Table 6: Summary results of the logit estimations using different definitions of 
ARREAR as the dependent variable 
  AREAR 1  ARREAR 2  ARREAR 3 
GROUP LEADER VARIABLES 
 
     
KNMEMDUM  -1.192 
(-1.948)* 
-1.117 
(-1.869)* 
 
AGE      0.049 
(2.635)*** 
AINSTAPA      2.239 
(2.167)** 
VFACCESS  1.082 
(2.684)*** 
0.695 
(1.894)* 
1.227 
(1.879)* 
OTHER GROUP MEMBERS 
 
     
AVINSTNGL  2.376 
(2.485)** 
1.663 
(1.876)* 
 
       
CONSTANT  -2.129 
(-2.700)*** 
-1.681 
(-2.184)*** 
-6.893 
(-4.121)*** 
       
Number of obs.  102  102  102 
Obs. with dependent = 0  68  74  89 
% of correctly predicted   75  75  91 
 McFadden 
2 R   0.11  0.07  0.16 
Notes:  The Z-statistics are given in parentheses. Explanation of the variable names can be 
found in table 2. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level.   32 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX  33 
Table A2: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
empirical analysis 
Variable name  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Standard 
Deviation 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
         
ARREAR 1  0.33  0  1  0  0.47 
ARREAR 2  0.27  0  1  0  0.45 
ARREAR 3  0.12  0  1  0  0.34 
           
GROUP LEADER VARIABLES 
 (=  vector GL) 
 
         
KNMEMDUM  0.84  1  1  0  0.36 
LIVE  32.71  31.50  75.00  2.00  19.14 
DIST   630.10  325.00  5000  5.00  1056.00 
VISTDUM   0.71  1  1  0  0.46 
VFACCESS  1.26  1.00  4.00  1.00  0.56 
AINSTAPA  0.38  0.33  1.21  0.06  0.23 
AGE  45.00  44.50  75.00  22.00  11.75 
EDUCATION  2.19  2  4  1  0.87 
           
OTHER GROUP MEMBERS 
(= vector NGL) 
 
         
AVKNMNGL   0.82  1  1  0  0.30 
AVLIVNGL  33.00  34.75  67.00  3.50  16.70 
AVDISTNGL  373.67  227.50  2766.67  5.00  444.21 
AVISTNGL  0.76  1  1  0  0.35 
AVFACNGL  1.45  1.33  5  1  0.68 
AVINSTNGL  0.42  0.34  1.73  0.05  0.25 
AVAGENGL   46.49  47.50  68.50  22.00  9.15 
AVEDUNGL  1.82  2  3  1  0.61 
           
OTHER VARIABLES 
(= vector GROUP) 
 
         
GRAGRDUM  0.28  0  1  0  0.45 
NOMEM  4.48  4  8  3  1.43 
 